

DEMO: SDN-based System to Filter Out DRDoS Amplification Traffic in ISP Networks

By

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Background

❑ Main Paper:

- ❑ Sorting the Garbage: Filtering Out DRDoS Amplification Traffic in ISP Networks
- ❑ Published in the Proceedings of IEEE NetSoft 2019
- ❑ Conference held in Paris, France in June 2019

❑ Demo Paper:

- ❑ Accepted at ACM's Computer & Communications Security (CCS) Conference
- ❑ To be held in London, UK from Nov 11th-15th

Problem

- ❑ DRDoS attacks are major threat to Internet with large scale impact
- ❑ Goal: Bring down victim network by bombarding it with garbage traffic
- ❑ Popular among attackers:
 - ❑ Low resource requirements: Small spoofed request packets can reflect large response to victim
 - ❑ Attacker stays anonymous: SRC IP spoofed with victim ip
- ❑ Attackers use vulnerable servers with open UDP ports (dns, ntp, sstp..) to reflect and amplify traffic to victim
 - ❑ Negative impact on benign users; owners of vulnerable machines
- ❑ ISPs host numerous vulnerable servers, if abused, can generate garbage (reflected amplified traffic) in Terabytes
 - ❑ Hard to detect
 - ❑ Loss of bandwidth and QOS to customers

Proposed Solution

- ❑ Our proposed solution:
 - ❑ Shield ***Amplifier Network vs Victim Network***
 - ❑ Most existing DRDoS solutions try to protect *victim networks*
 - ❑ Protect vulnerable amplifiers from spoofed amplification requests
 - ❑ Stop attack Midway
 - ❑ Detect **spoofed** traffic and filter out at edge of an ISP before it reaches amplifiers
 - ❑ Thereby reducing the storm of attack traffic directed towards the victim
 - ❑ Benefit ISPs and their customers
 - ❑ Reduce wasteful bandwidth consumption of ISP
 - ❑ Prevent loss of money for ISPs (asymmetric traffic agreements)
 - ❑ Prevent QoS degradation due to amplification during ongoing DRDoS attacks

Our Solution Prototype

- ❑ **Software Defined Networking** based system to filter out garbage traffic from an ISP network
- ❑ Simulate the test network in GNS3
- ❑ **Network Components**
 - ❑ Python based POX - SDN Controller
 - ❑ OpenFlow Edge Switch
 - ❑ Cisco Routers
 - ❑ Ubuntu based Host devices in ISP network
 - ❑ Amplification Honeypot installed on one of the ISP hosts
 - ❑ Listens to any incoming spoofed attack requests abusing udp services

GNS3

❑ **GNS3:**

- ❑ Network Simulator software that seamlessly glues together different open source software
- ❑ Allows to emulate a network that includes cisco routers, switches, cisco devices and any other devices that can run on QEMU or virtual box emulator
- ❑ It also allows to connect the virtual network to the physical network, it is possible to access Internet in the emulated environment

❑ Each device in GNS3 is a **docker** image

- ❑ DOCKER containers are similar to virtual machines but *light weight*
- ❑ They run on same kernel as the host
 - ❑ Quick Startup: Doesn't simulate entire OS
 - ❑ More efficient in host resource usage

Demonstration

1. Main network components
2. Details of initial configuration steps
3. Launch DRDoS from attacker machine
 - a. We show **spoofed** attack traffic sent:
 - i. **ATTACKER -> REFLECTOR HOST at ISP**
 - ii. **REFLECTOR HOST -> VICTIM**

Demonstration

4. We show how honeypot detects amplification requests and issues **block rule**
 - a. We show reflected traffic from ISP stops reaching victim machine
 - i. Spoofed requests from **ATTACKER -> AMPLIFIER** are dropped at ISP
 - ii. No reflection after block rule is added
 - b. Attack packets observable at honeypot
 - i. **Proactive honeypot rule implemented with high priority**
 - ii. Traffic to honeypot is not blocked so it can monitor attack end **to remove block rule**
5. We show once attack ends, the **block rule** is dropped from switch table and packets to victim SRC IP resume flow normally.

Demo Steps : Initial Set up

1. **Initial Setup:** Install Python on Controller and Honeypot machines
 - ❑ Controller runs python based DRDoS server script
 - ❑ Honeypot runs client script
 - ❑ Install honeypot configuration (*python setup.py*)
2. Terminal to **network components:**
 - ❑ Attacker, Host, Victim
 - ❑ Controller, Switch, Honeypot
3. **Startup:** Start DRDoS App and server script at **Controller**
 - ❑ Ping controller -> switch and all connected machines
 - ❑ `./pox.py log.level --DEBUG forwarding.controller openflow.discovery`
 - ❑ Connectivity between machines:
 - ❑ Ping controller -> switch
 - ❑ Ping honeypot (10.0.0.4) -> host (10.0.0.5)
 - ❑ Ping Attacker (20.0.0.2) -> honeypot/host
 - ❑ Ping Victim (30.0.0.2) -> honeypot/host

Demo Steps

4. **Attack Start:** Abusing reflector at ISP
 - ❑ **Host :** tcpdump host 10.0.0.5 -nnS
 - ❑ **Victim :** tcpdump host 30.0.0.2 -nnS
 - ❑ **Attacker -> Host:** nping --icmp -S 30.0.0.2 10.0.0.5 -c 20(spoofed SRC IP)

5. Start attack monitor and client script at **Honeypot**
 - ❑ **Honeypot client script:** src/DDoSHoneypot.py
 - ❑ **Attacker -> Honeypot:** nping --udp -p123 -S 30.0.0.2 10.0.0.4 -c 4 (spoofed SRC IP)

6. **Attack Detection** at Honeypot
 - ❑ Show **block rule** at **Openflow switch** : Blocks reflection of packets to victim SRCIP
 - ❑ **Attacker -> Host:** nping --icmp -S 30.0.0.2 10.0.0.5 -c 20 (spoofed SRC IP)
 - ❑ Honeypot proactive rule with high priority (**cookie #6**)
 - ❑ Show packets received at honeypot during blockage
 - ❑ **Attacker -> Honeypot (Honeypot continues to receive packets):**
 - ❑ nping --udp -p123 -S 30.0.0.2 10.0.0.4 -c 4 (spoofed SRC IP)

7. Attack ends and block rule is dropped as instructed by honeypot

Extra Commands

- Port open:
 - apt install xinetd
 - nano /etc/xinetd.d/chargen
 - /etc/init.d/xinetd restart
 - nping --udp -S 30.0.0.2 10.0.0.5 -c 10 -p 19
 - tcpdump host -nnS 10.0.0.5 <host>
 - tcpdump host -nnS 30.0.0.2 <victim>